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CRYPTANALYSIS OF SHIFTED CONJUGACY
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
JONATHAN LONGRIGG AND ALEXANDER USHAKOV
Abstract. In this paper we present the first practical attack on the
shifted conjugacy-based authentication protocol proposed by P. Dehornoy
in [5]. We discuss the weaknesses of that primitive and propose ways to
improve the protocol.
1. Introduction
Let Bn be the group of braids on n strands given by its standard Artin
presentation
Bn =
〈
σ1, . . . , σn−1
∣∣∣∣ σiσjσi = σjσiσj if |i− j| = 1σiσj = σjσi if |i− j| > 1
〉
,
and let B∞ be the group of braids on infinitely many strands generated
by an infinite family {σ1, σ2, . . .} subject to the same relations. There are
several normal forms available for elements of Bn, e.g., Garside normal form
[6, Chapter 9], or the Birman-Ko-Lee normal form [1]. For the purposes of
this paper it is convenient to define the length of an element x ∈ Bn to be
the length of its Garside normal form and denote it by |x|∆n .
For a braid word w = σε1i1 . . . σ
εk
ik
over the group alphabet of B∞ define a
braid word
d(w) = σε1i1+1 . . . σ
εk
ik+1
.
The mapping w 7→ d(w) induces a monomorphism of B∞ and is referred to
as a shift operator. Now, for braids a, b ∈ B∞ define a braid a ∗ b by
(1) a ∗ b = a · d(b) · σ1 · d(a
−1).
The operator ∗ : B∞ ×B∞ → B∞ is called the shifted conjugacy operator.
The Dehornoy authentication protocol is the following sequence of steps.
First, Alice prepares her public and private keys. She randomly chooses
elements s, p ∈ Bn, and computes p
′ = s ∗ p. The element s is called her
private key (to be kept secret) and the pair (p, p′) is called her public key (to
be published).
The protocol is a Fiat-Shamir-style [7] authentication protocol in which
a single round of the protocol is performed as follows:
A. Alice chooses a random r ∈ Bn and sends a pair (x, x
′) (called the
commitment) to Bob, where x = r ∗ p and x′ = r ∗ p′.
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B. Bob chooses a random bit b (called the challenge) and sends it to
Alice:
0) If b = 0 then Alice sends y = r to Bob, and Bob checks that
the equalities x = y ∗ p and x′ = y ∗ p′ are satisfied.
1) If b = 1 then Alice sends y = r ∗ s to Bob, and Bob checks that
the equality x′ = y ∗ x is satisfied.
Noting that u ∗ (v ∗w) = (u ∗ v) ∗ (u ∗w), it is straightforward to check that
a correct answer y to a challenge leads to a successful check.
To break the system it is sufficient to find any s′ ∈ Bn satisfying s
′∗p = p′.
Hence the security of this protocol is, in particular, based on the difficulty
of the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem (ShCSP) which is the following
algorithmic question:
For a pair of braids p, p′ ∈ B∞ find a braid s ∈ B∞ such that
p′ = s ∗ p (provided that such s exists).
Similarly one can formulate the Shifted Conjugacy Decision Problem (ShCDP):
For a pair of braids p, p′ ∈ B∞ determine if there exists a
braid s ∈ B∞ such that p
′ = s ∗ p.
These problems first appeared in [5] and were not explored enough to give a
precise answer about their time complexity or even decidability (for the de-
cision problem). Despite the resemblance to the conjugacy decision problem
(CDP) which is decidable and suspected to have polynomial-time solution
(see [2], [3]), it is not clear if ShCDP is solvable.
It is not discussed in Dehornoy’s original paper [5] how to generate public
and private keys, the author just proposes a primitive and provides some
intuition on why the primitive might be hard. In this paper we use the easiest
method of key generation: keys are chosen uniformly from the ambient free
group and then considered as words in the braid group.
1) Fix the rank of the braid group n. It is an important parameter in
the scheme, efficiency of all the operations depends on it.
2) Fix numbers L and K, the key lengths. These numbers are the main
security parameters. (In all our experiments L = K.)
3) Pick randomly and uniformly a braid word p (resp. s) from the set
of all braid words of length L (resp. K.)
4) Finally, compute p′ = s ∗ p.
To summarize the results of our work:
A. Even though it seems unlikely that ShCSP can be deterministically
reduced to CSP we argue that ShCSP can be reduced to CSP gener-
ically (for most of the inputs) and present the reduction.
B. We present the results of actual experiments. The following table
shows the percentage of success in our experiment. The number of
successes where the result was equal to the original key is in brackets.
For instance, if the key length is 100 and the platform group is B40
then, using our attack, in 24% of cases we recovered an element
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s ∈ Bn such that p
′ = s ∗ p and hence broke the protocol. In 10%
of the cases the obtained element was equal to the original s ∈ Bn
generated by Alice.
Key length, K = L 100 400 800
B10 100(100) 100(100) 100(100)
B40 24(10) 99(99) 92(92)
B80 2(0) 47(39) 92(92)
Table 1. Success rate in our experiments.
C. We analyze the results and make several recommendations on how
to generate hard instances of ShCSP.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our heuristic
algorithm and argue that it works for most inputs. In Section 3 we present
more detailed results of experiments (than in the table above), discuss the
reasons for success/failure, and make suggestions on the generation of hard
keys.
All the algorithms described in this paper are available at [4].
2. The attack
In this section we present the mathematical background for the attack.
For n ∈ N define braids
δn = σn−1 . . . σ1,
∆n = (σn−1 . . . σ1) · (σn−1 . . . σ2) · . . . · (σn−1).
It is easy to check that for any i = 1, . . . , n− 1 the following equality holds
in Bn+1:
(2) δ−1n+1σiδn+1 =Bn+1 σi+1 = d(σi).
Proposition 2.1. Let p, p′, s ∈ Bn. Then s satisfies the shifted conjugacy
equation for p and p′
(3) p′ =Bn+1 s ∗ p,
if and only if it satisfies the conjugacy equation for p′δ−1n+1 and d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
(4) p′δ−1n+1 =Bn+1 s · d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 · s
−1.
Proof. Follows from (2).

Proposition 2.2. Let p, p′, s ∈ Bn be braids satisfying p
′ =Bn+1 s ∗ p, and
let s′ ∈ Bn+1. Then
p′δ−1n+1 =Bn+1 s
′ · d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 · s
′−1 ⇐⇒ s′−1s ∈ CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
where CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
denotes the centralizer of d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 in Bn+1.
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Proof. Obvious.

Now, it follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 that the ShCSP can be
solved in two steps:
(S1) Find a solution s′ ∈ Bn+1 of the equation p
′δ−1n+1 =Bn+1 s
′·d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1·
s′−1. This can be done using the ultra summit set technique invented
in [8].
(S2) “Correct” the element s′ ∈ Bn+1 to obtain a solution s ∈ Bn of
(3), i.e., find a suitable element c ∈ CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
such that
t = s′c ∈ Bn satisfies (3). We refer to this step as a centralizer
attack.
The description of ultra summit sets is out of the scope of our paper, so
we omit details on step (S1). Step (S2) requires some elaboration. To be
able to work with elements of C = CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
efficiently we need
to describe C in some convenient way, for instance, by providing a set of
generators. Hence, step (S2) itself consists of two smaller steps: capturing
C and finding the required element c ∈ C.
The only known algorithm [10] for computing a generating set for a cen-
tralizer reduces to the construction of so-called super summit sets, the size
of which is not known to be polynomially-bounded, and which is usually
hard in practice. Hence, the approach of describing the whole generating
set does not seem feasible. Instead, we can work with the subgroup of
CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
considered in Proposition 2.3. For p ∈ Bn define braids:
c1 = ∆
2
n+1, c2 = d(p)σ
−1
2 . . . σ
−1
n , c3 = σ1 . . . σ
2
nσn−1 . . . σ1,
and
c4 = c
−1
1 , c5 = c
−1
2 , c6 = c
−1
3 .
Proposition 2.3. Let p ∈ Bn and C = CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
. The following
holds:
• c1, c2, c3 ∈ C,
• C ′ = 〈c1, c2, c3〉 is an abelian subgroup of Bn+1 and, hence, has
polynomial growth.
Proof. Observe that the equality
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 =Bn+1 d(p)σ
−1
2 . . . σ
−1
n
holds in Bn+1 and the element d(p)σ
−1
2 . . . σ
−1
n involves generators σ2, . . . , σn
only. It is intuitively obvious that c2 commutes with c3 when you observe
that in the braid diagram for c3 none of strands 2 to n cross over. Further-
more, c1 generates the center of Bn+1. Thus, the subgroup C
′ is abelian.

Now, having fixed the subgroup C ′ = 〈c1, c2, c3〉 we can describe the
heuristic procedure for finding the required c ∈ C ′. For any braid t ∈ Bn
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define
lt = |p
′−1(t ∗ p)|∆n+1
and observe that t = s′c satisfies t ∗p = p′ if and only if lt = 0 and the value
of lt can be used to guide our heuristic search, the smaller lt the “closer” t
to the actual solution.
We summarize the ideas of this section into an heuristic algorithm (Algo-
rithm 2.4) which for a pair of braids p, p′ ∈ Bn attempts to find s ∈ Bn such
that p′ =Bn+1 s ∗ p. The algorithm starts out by finding a solution s
′ to the
conjugacy equation (4). It keeps two sets: S (elements in working) and M
(worked out elements) of pairs (t, lt) where t ∈ Bn+1 is a possible solution
and lt = |p
′−1(t ∗ p)|∆n+1 . Initially, we have S = {(s
′, ls′)}, where s
′ is found
in step (S1) and ls′ = |p
′−1(s′ ∗ p)|∆n+1 . On each iteration we choose a pair
(t, lt) from S with the smallest value lt (the “fittest” one). If lt = 0 then
t is a solution. If lt 6= 0 then compute new possible solutions ti = tci and
add corresponding pairs (ti, lti) into S. After all (ti, lti) are added to S the
current pair (t, lt) becomes worked out.
Algorithm 2.4. (Heuristic algorithm for solving ShCSP)
Input: Braids p, p′ ∈ Bn.
Output: A braid s ∈ Bn such that p
′ =B∞ s ∗ p.
Computation:
A. Using the ultra summit set technique compute s′ ∈ Bn+1 satisfying
p′δ−1n+1 =Bn+1 s
′ · d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 · s
′−1.
B. Put S = (s′, |p′−1(s′ ∗ p)|∆n+1) and M = ∅.
C. Until a solution is found:
1. Choose a pair (t, lt) from S with the smallest lt.
2. If lt = 0 then output t.
3. Otherwise for each i = 1, . . . , 6
(i) Compute ti = t · ci and lti = |p
′−1(ti ∗ p)|∆i+1
(ii) If (ti, lti) belongs neither to S nor to M then add it into
S.
4. Remove the current pair (t, lt) from S and add it into M .
3. Experimental results
Algorithm 2.4 always produces the correct answer when it halts, though
it does not always stop. There are two possible reasons for a failure.
1) Failure on step A. The precise complexity of the ultra summit set
algorithm is not known, though it is proved that for certain classes
of braids it is polynomial. But even if it is polynomial, the degree of
a polynomial can be too large to be used in practical computations.
2) Failure in the loop C. There are two possible reasons for this. The
first reason is that we use a subgroup C ′ of C = CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
which can be a proper subgroup and it might not contain the required
element.
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The second reason is that the heuristic based on the length |p′−1(si∗
p)|∆n+1 might be bad.
To test the efficiency of the algorithm we performed a series of experiments
in which we limited the time allowed for each part: 1 hour for step A and 15
minutes for step C on a personal computer (CPU 2.66 GHz). The percentage
of success in experiments for different parameters is shown in Table 1. Below
we present detailed information on each step of computations.
Recall that in step A we solve the conjugacy search problem for braids
p′δ−1n+1 and d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 in Bn+1. The percentage of failure on step A is
shown in Table 2. We see that the shorter the length of the key p relative
to the rank of the braid group the harder it becomes to solve the conjugacy
search problem. We cannot explain this phenomenon, the method of ultra
summit sets is very difficult to analyze. We suspect that the reason for such
behavior is that shorter words are less likely to be rigid (expose free-like
behavior when cycling.)
Key length 100 400 800
B10 0 of 100 (0.00%) 0 of 100 (0.00%) 0 of 100 (0.00%)
B40 9 of 100 (9.00%) 0 of 100 (0.00%) 1 of 100 (0.00%)
B80 59 of 100 (59.00%) 12 of 100 (12.00%) 6 of 100 (6.00%)
Table 2. Failure on step A
The percentage of failure in loop C of Algorithm 2.4, given that step A
was successfully completed, is shown in Table 3. Essentially, we see the same
pattern of failure as in the solution of the conjugacy problem in Table 2.
The shorter the length of the key relative to the rank of the braid group the
harder it is to find a suitable element of the centralizer. These results are
easier to explain. Basically the shorter the key the bigger the centralizer.
Hence, for shorter elements it is more likely that C ′ is a proper subgroup
of C = CBn+1
(
d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1
)
and less likely that C ′ actually contains the
required element c.
Key length 100 400 800
B10 0 of 100 (0.00%) 0 of 100 (0.00%) 0 of 100 (0.00%)
B40 67 of 91 (73.62%) 1 of 100 (1.00%) 7 of 99 (7.07%)
B80 39 of 41 (95.12%) 41 of 88 (46.59%) 2 of 94 (2.12%)
Table 3. Failure in loop C
4. Conclusions
In this section we discuss methods of key generation invulnerable to the
attack proposed in Section 2. Recall that the success of the attack relies on
two properties of braids p, p′:
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(1) the conjugacy search problem is easy for the pair (p′δ−1n+1, d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1)
in Bn+1;
(2) the centralizer CBn+1(d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1) is “small” (isomorphic to an Abelian
group of small rank.)
If either of the two properties above is not satisfied then the attack is likely
to fail. Even though there is no known polynomial time algorithm solving
CSP for braids, recent developments of [2] and [3] suggest that CSP might
be easy for generic braids (pseudo-Anosov type) and it might be difficult to
randomly construct hard instances for CSP. Though there is no proof yet
that the pseudo-Anosov type of braids is generic it is a common belief that
this is so. Another interesting recent development is [12] where the authors
present a few braids with very large ultra summit sets.
The only part which can be controlled is the growth and structure of
the centralizer C. As we mentioned above the only known algorithm for
computing a generating set for a centralizer reduces to construction of super
summit sets which is not known to be polynomially hard and is usually very
inefficient practically. We can choose p so that C(d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1) is a large
non-Abelian group. For more on the structure of centralizers see [11]. For
ideas on how to generate elements with large centralizers see [13].
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